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Can the ‘Post-national Constellation’ be Re-constitutionalized? 
ABSTRACT 
The constitutionalization of the state, the juridification of political power is one of the 
major achievements in the civilization of modern politics. Can and will this achieve-
ment survive the post-national constellation?  
The state no longer possesses all powers but some of its ruling authority has been 
transferred to non-state actors. Increasingly, regulations are the result of negotiations 
and agreements between state agencies and private parties. This, on the one hand, af-
fects democratic legitimacy, since the parliaments are more and more sidelined. But 
these processes also undermine the rule of law. Such agreements evade the necessary 
formalization of law as they are rarely publicized. Nevertheless they are necessary to 
provide public goods. Globalization and internationalization further aggravate this prob-
lem. And the constitutionalization of international politics offers no ready-made solu-
tion for this problem: The WTO or even the EU both have to rely on the regular means 
of physical coercion still controlled by nation states. Even the EU is not a union of the 
people but of its member states, its democratic legitimacy is limited and, above all, its 
legalization and constitutionalization is rather circumscribed, and that can be attributed 
to the very same forces which also undermine democratic accountability at the state 
level.  
The aspiration expressed in the concept of constitutions and constitutionalization can, 
therefore, not even be approximately realized on the global level. Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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Can the ‘Post-national Constellation’ be Re-constitutionalized? 
∗ 
I. THE CLAIM OF THE CONSTITUTION 
In 1973 Niklas Luhmann could still assert that a radical change in the state of the consti-
tution and the institutional and operational understanding of constitutional arrangements 
comparable to the establishment of the constitutional state in the late eighteenth century 
has never occurred again (Luhmann 1973: 4). In the meantime, such a change is loom-
ing. Its cause is the process of the decline of statehood [Entstaatlichung], which could 
not then be foreseen. In essence, this consists of the transfer of public power to non-
state actors and its exercise in non-state procedures. This has consequences for the con-
stitution because it originally referred to the state. Its historical significance lay in the 
juridification [Verrechtlichung] of public power, and public power was identical to state 
power. Owing to the advantages associated with this, the constitution was regarded as a 
civilizing achievement up to the present day (Luhmann 1990). Pre-state forms of politi-
cal rule not only had no constitution, they could not have had one. The question is 
whether this achievement can survive in the “postnational constellation.” (Habermas 
2001). 
By constitution I understand here the law produced through a political decision that 
regulates the establishment and exercise of political rule. The constitution in this sense 
is a novelty of the eighteenth century that of course did not arise out of nothing, but had 
not previously existed in this form (Grimm 2002a; 1995b: 10ff.). The normative consti-
tution came into being in 1776 on the periphery of what was then the western world, in 
North America. Thirteen years later, in 1789, it reached Europe. In Europe and the other 
parts of the world it influenced, the whole nineteenth century was permeated and deter-
mined by the struggle around the spread of the constitution. The victory the idea of con-
stitutionalism seemed to win at the end of the First World War, however, turned out to 
be short-lived. Only toward the end of the twentieth century, after numerous detours and 
reversals, did constitutionalism prevail universally. Today, constitutionless states are the 
exception, which, of course, is not to say that the constitution is intended or taken seri-
ously everywhere.  
                                                 
∗   This paper is an expanded and revised version of the inaugural lecture for the Collaborative Research Centre (Sfb) 
“Transformations of the State,” (TranState) presented on January 15, 2004 in Die Glocke in Bremen. For a German 
version see „Die Verfassung im Prozess der Entstaatlichung“, in: Michael Brenner, ed,, Der Staat des Grundgeset-
zes. Kontinuität und Wandel. Festschrift für Peter Badura zum siebzigste Geburtstag (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck) 
2004, pp. 145-167. Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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Concerning its novelty, we should not let ourselves be deceived by the fact that the 
notion of ‘constitution’ is older than the US and French constitutions. Before their ap-
pearance it was not a normative concept but an empirical one (Mohnhaupt/Grimm 
2002). Brought into political language from the description of nature, it designated the 
condition of a country, as shaped by the character of its territory and inhabitants, its 
historical development and prevailing power relations, its legal norms and political in-
stitutions. With social philosophy’s increasing effort to restrict state power in favor of 
the freedom of subjects, the notion of “constitution” was narrowed; its non-normative 
elements were gradually cast off until the constitution finally appeared to be the condi-
tion determined by public law. It was nevertheless not the kernel of constitutional norms 
but rather the condition they determined that was designated by the word “constitution.”  
The late-eighteenth-century revolutions in North America and France violently over-
threw ancestral rule and established a new order on the basis of rational planning and 
legal codification. Only then, did a transition from a descriptive to a prescriptive con-
cept occur. Since then the constitution has ordinarily been identified with the complex 
of norms that fundamentally and comprehensively regulate the establishment and exer-
cise of state power. The empirical constitution did not disappear, but returned in the 
shape of the “constitutional reality” that influences the law. But when we speak of con-
stitutionalization, we always speak of the legal and not the factual constitution. The le-
gal constitution does not reproduce social reality but addresses expectations to it, the 
fulfillment of which does not go without saying and for just this reason requires legal 
support. The constitution thus takes its distance from political reality and only thereby 
acquires the ability to serve as standard for political behavior and judgment.  
If the legal constitution did not arise earlier, this is because it depends on precondi-
tions that did not exist in the past. For a long time the constitution in the sense of a law 
that specializes in norming political rule lacked an object.
1 Before the functional differ-
entiation of society there was no social system that, by its delimitation from other sys-
tems, specialized in the exercise of political rule. Rather, the tasks of ruling were di-
vided up by location, subject matter, and function among numerous independent bear-
ers. There was no comprehensive political body to which the particular rights of rule 
could have been ascribed. Rights referred less to territories than to people. Their bearers 
exercised them not as independent functions but as an adjunct of a certain social status, 
namely, as landholders. What are now held apart as private and public were still mixed 
together.  
                                                 
1  See Helmut Quaritsch (1970: 182ff.); on the older order of domination, see Quaritsch (1970: 196ff.), as well as 
Otto Brunner (1970); on the significance of the transition to functional differentiation, see Niklas Luhmann (1997: 
595ff.; 2000: 69ff.). Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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This is not to say that rule was exercised without any legal bounds. To the contrary, 
there was a dense mesh of legal bonds that were traced back to a divine foundation or 
held traditionally. For this reason they had priority over the enacted law and could not 
be altered by it. But these legal bonds did not represent a constitution in the sense of a 
particular law specializing in the exercise of political rule. Just as the authority to rule 
was only a dependent adjunct of other legal positions, it was governed by the corre-
sponding law. From this we see that not every juridification of authority results in a 
constitution. The many works devoted to the ancient or medieval constitution do not 
thereby lose their value. But one must not confuse these constitutions with the norma-
tive text, implemented on the basis of a political decision that claims to regulate rule.  
From the perspective that interests us here, the decline of statehood, however, it is 
more significant that only with the modern state does an object emerge capable of hav-
ing a constitution. Like the normative constitution, the state too was a historical novelty, 
but temporally it preceded the constitution. State-building arose when religious divi-
sions removed the basis for the medieval order based on divine revelation and a new 
form of political domination developed in continental Europe in reaction to the confes-
sional civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (cf. Schnur 1962; Tilly 
1975; Anderson 1979; Dyson 1980). It was based on the conviction, prepared by Bodin 
and other French theorists, that only a superior power can settle civil wars. This superior 
power raises itself above the warring parties and possesses sufficient power resources to 
establish and enforce a new order independent of contested religious truths, and thus to 
reestablish domestic peace.  
In this effort, the princes of various territories, starting with France, undertook to 
unite the numerous, scattered prerogatives and consolidate comprehensive public power 
over the territory. Because of the need to build a new order, public power also included 
the right to make laws, which was no longer limited by a higher law derived from God. 
In fact, rulers continued to regard themselves as divinely legitimated, and did not dis-
avow the bindingness of divine command. But this command no longer had legal effect. 
Instead, law was made by a worldly authority and in this sense positivized. As positive, 
it no longer drew its validity from its accordance with God’s plan for salvation, but 
from the ruler’s will; divine or natural law, its name notwithstanding, lost its legal qual-
ity and was now only morally binding.  
The previously unknown notion of the “state” soon became current for this new kind 
of polity. If it was later also applied by historians to earlier periods, this was a matter of 
the reassignation of an object of another kind. The state possessed sovereignty, defined 
as the highest power, subordinate to no other external or internal power. Like the thing 
it designated, this concept too was new (see Quaritsch 1970, 1986; Boldt 1990; Wein-
acht 1968). At its core, sovereignty signified the ruler’s right to make the law for all his Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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subjects without himself being legally bound. Externally, this designated the right to 
determine domestic conditions free from the interference of other states. The means for 
enforcing this claim was the monopoly on the use of force in Max Weber’s sense,
2 the 
flipside of which was the elimination of all intermediary powers. The establishment of 
the sovereign state thus went along with the privatization of society. The mixture of 
private and public was dissolved.  
Of course, the establishment of the state was not an event but a process that did not 
reach its conclusion anywhere on the continent before the French Revolution and which 
had scarcely begun in England when it was limited by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
(Schröder 1986). Unlike the French and American Revolutions that followed a century 
later, England saw a revolution in defense of the old order, namely the rights of parlia-
ment, against the crown’s transformative designs. For this reason it did not lead to a 
constitution in the modern sense.
3 On the continent, however, there was now an object 
capable of having a constitution in the form of a state that did not hold a number of pre-
rogatives but public power, and specialized in its exercise. If nevertheless no constitu-
tion in the modern sense emerged, this was because the state developed under these 
conditions as an absolutist princely state, defined precisely by not being bound by law.  
This is not to assert the complete absence of legal restrictions on the ruler. There 
were restrictions of this kind even under absolute monarchy. But insofar as they were 
not simply the vestiges of earlier historical layers, they could only be conceived as self-
restrictions on princely power. Normally they were wrested from the ruler by particular 
groups of well-placed subjects and fixed in so-called charters [Herrschaftsverträgen], 
whose validity was based on the unanimous wills of the participants (Vierhaus 1977). 
As contractually binding, however, these restrictions always presupposed the authority 
of the monarch to rule. They restricted his authority to rule, which was in principle 
comprehensive, only punctually. They did not benefit all the subjects; rather, their ef-
fects were reserved for the privileged contractual partners. As far as they extended, they 
juridified political rule, but nowhere did they appear with the comprehensive claim to 
legitimation and regulation that distinguishes the modern constitution.  
Nor did the social philosophy of the time, which saw at once that the new concentra-
tion of power confronted it with the question of a non-transcendental legitimation of 
rule, extend its efforts as far as the idea of a constitution.
4 For social philosophy, any 
                                                 
2   Max Weber (1921/1978: pt. I, ch. 1, § 17; pt. II, ch. 8, § 2; ch. 9, § 2) and Anter (1995). 
3   But see the short-lived “Instrument of Government” imposed after the abolition of the monarchy under Cromwell: 
text in Samuel Gardiner (1968: 405). 
4   The sole exception was Emer de Vattel (1758); see Mohnhaupt and Grimm (2002: 91f., 105). Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
- 5 - 
rule that – assuming rational behavior – could be thought of as emerging from the free 
agreement of all was legitimate. In this way, the consensus of the subjects of rule was 
elevated to the central category grounding legitimacy. In social contract theory, how-
ever, it was neither traced back to an actual contract nor fixed in a written agreement, 
but rather used as a hypothetical test of whether one could consent to rule. The theory of 
the social contract thus did not fundamentally place in question existing rule that was 
independent of consensus as long as it corresponded to the particular rational impera-
tives for which the contract was only a theoretical bridge.  
Nevertheless, the conditions under which philosophy assumed the readiness of ra-
tional beings to leave the state of nature and to submit themselves to government 
changed in the course of time (v. Gierke 1958; Kersting 1994; Klippel 1976). In re-
sponse to civil war, it even arrived at a justification of absolute rule. Only when the in-
dividual ceded all his natural rights to the state and completely submitted to it would the 
state be in the position to guarantee his physical safety. In the face of the existential 
threat of civil war, this had the highest priority. Once the absolutist state had success-
fully concluded the civil war and re-established domestic peace, the complete surrender 
of natural rights no longer appeared plausible. Now it sufficed for the individual to give 
up the right to use force in pursuit of his own interests. Otherwise he retained his natural 
freedoms, and the state drew its justification precisely from protecting those freedoms 
from encroachments.  
These ideas were put into action when in North America and France ancestral rule 
was toppled by revolution and the resulting power vacuum had to be filled. In this situa-
tion, it was decisive for the emergence of the constitution that in both cases the revolu-
tionaries were not satisfied with replacing the overthrown rulers with other ones. Acting 
as representatives of the people, they first designed a model of legitimate rule; only on 
the basis of this model were individuals called upon to exercise the rights of rule. Cen-
tral here were two basic principles that had been developed in theory as mere regulative 
ideas and were now reformulated as real conditions: first, that legitimate domination 
arose from the consensus of those subject to it; and second, that the latter had innate and 
inalienable rights, the securing of which was the legitimizing aim of political rule.  
The task of securing equal freedom, which according to the conviction of the time 
would lead to prosperity and justice without intervention by the state, also required 
power. The French Revolution therefore touched neither the state nor its attribute of 
sovereignty. It rather completed the state-building that had begun under absolutism by 
dissolving the intermediary powers that had survived under the absolutist regime, thus 
making public and state power identical. By the same stroke, however, the bearer of 
state power was replaced. The nation took the place of the monarch. Rule could there-
fore not be legitimated by one’s own but only be a derived right. Article Three of the Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen formulated the basic principle of 
the democratic constitutional state: “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially 
in the nation. No body or individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed 
directly from the nation.”  
Unlike in France, in America the revolution was not preceded by state-building in the 
continental sense. In the motherland of the American colonists, religious disunity had 
not led to the rise of absolutist monarchy but, to the contrary, to the strengthening of 
parliament and an essentially liberal legal order. The American revolutionaries therefore 
were not in a position to take over a state in the continental sense in order to supply it 
with a new basis of legitimacy and adjust it to the principle of individual freedom. 
Nonetheless, they too constituted a political unity they understood as government, 
which possessed the qualities of states. Although the American state lagged behind con-
tinental states in its tasks, instruments, and bureaucratic apparatus, it too was the focal 
point of all public power, which it took from the people so that there could no longer be 
any claim to rule that could not be traced back to its will.  
The possession and exercise of public power were thus separated. The political sys-
tem therefore had to be organized in a way that established a relation of legitimation and 
responsibility between those who possessed the ruling powers and those who exercised 
them, as much as possible preventing their misuse. It was these constructive tasks of 
state organization and limitation that well-nigh compelled legal regulation. Only law 
had the ability to elevate the consensus concerning the project of legitimate rule above 
the fleetingness of the moment, to make it last, and to give it binding force. The Ameri-
cans were the first to take this step. It helped them that they had already inherited a fa-
miliar model for the legally binding organization of public power in the English declara-
tions of rights and colonial charters bestowed on them by the mother country 
(Kelly/Harbison 1963: chs. 1, 2; Adams 1973: 30ff.; Lutz 1988: 13ff.; Stourzh 1989: 
1ff.). France, in its revolution thirteen years later, could look to the American model.  
First, however, it was necessary to clear another hurdle: since its positivization, the 
law that was now to bind the state was a product of precisely this state. Under these cir-
cumstances, the state could   only be bound successfully if one resorted to the idea of a 
hierarchy of norms, but cut it off from its transcendental roots. This led to a splitting of 
the positivized legal order into two complexes: a traditional one that was produced by 
the state and bound the individual; and a new one that proceeded from or was ascribed 
to the sovereign and bound the state. The latter is the constitution as distinct from the 
laws and taking precedent over them. This was the very step by which the Americans 
surpassed the English “constitution” (Grimm 2002b: 75ff.: 2002c). While the English 
“constitution” did not constitute government but only partially restricted it, American 
and then French constitutional law was to precede all governmental powers. In the con-Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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stitution the law accordingly became reflexive: the process of legislation and implemen-
tation were for their part juridified.  
Primacy therefore is an indispensable element of constitutionalism. Where it is miss-
ing, the constitution cannot carry out the task for which it was invented (Wahl 1981: 
485). In America and France this was clear from the beginning. In the Federalist Papers 
(no. 78) it was compared to the relationship of principal to deputy, or servant to master 
(Hamilton et. al. 1999: 432-440). Sieyès summed it up in the distinction between the 
pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué (1975: 117-96; Pasquino 1998). The pou-
voir constituant generates the pouvoir constitué; its decision is thus not legally bound 
itself. But it does not go beyond creating and regulating legitimate rule. Ruling itself is a 
matter for the pouvoir constitué. However, the latter may act only on the basis of and 
within the framework of the constitution. In a constitutional state there can be no extra- 
or supra-constitutional powers beneath the pouvoir constituant. Only thus can the goal 
of the constitutionalization of public power be ensured – a “government of laws and not 
of men.”
5  
As against older legal restrictions on rule, the constitution was not only rule-
modifying but rule-constituting, limiting state power not only for the benefit of a privi-
leged group but generally, and deploying its state-limiting effect not only in certain re-
spects but comprehensively.
6 This is not to assert the total juridification of the state. 
That would render politics impossible and ultimately dissolve it into a mere implemen-
tation of the constitution. The constitution is not to make politics superfluous but only to 
channel it, commit it to certain principles, and contain it within certain limits. It pre-
scribes certain principles and procedures, not outcomes. But it is comprehensive insofar 
as no one who lacks constitutional legitimation is entitled to exercise public power, and 
no act of rule can claim validity that is not consistent with constitutional requirements.  
This tacitly presupposes the concentration of all ruling authority in the state. Only on 
this presupposition could the claim to comprehensively juridify political rule through a 
special set of legal norms addressed to the state be redeemed. This presupposition im-
plies the clear distinction between private and public. The principle of freedom is fun-
damental for the private sphere, and the principle of bindingness is fundamental for the 
state, Only when society is privatized in the sense that it does not possess the instru-
ments of rule, while, conversely, all authorities to rule are concentrated in the state, can 
these principles hold. Here we have not one conceivable form of constitution among 
others, but a constitutive feature of constitutionalism in general. The constitution would 
                                                 
5   Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (Cranch) 137 (163). 1803. 
6  In more detail see Grimm (2002), Badura (1973), Böckenförde (1991), Brunner (1956), Dilcher (1988), Hofmann 
(1986), McIlwain (1966: 31ff.), Mohnhaupt (1998: 121ff.) and Quaritsch (1970: 178ff.). Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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be undermined if the state enjoyed the freedom of the private, just as if the private pos-
sessed the coercive means of the state. To this extent, the border between private and 
public is essential to constitutionalism.  
But the constitution was also bound to the state constitution in the sense that its com-
prehensive validity claim was territorially limited from the beginning. Although the idea 
of constitutionalism claimed universal validity, it was realized in the particular, in dif-
ferent states from the start. These were separated by borders, beyond which state power 
did not extend. The borders might shift, for example as a result of wars. But that did not 
alter the fact that only one state power existed on the territory of a state, and that it did 
not share its entitlement to rule with anyone. To this extent, the constitution also pre-
supposed a clear separation of inside and outside. Had its borders been permeable to 
external claims to rule, it could not have fulfilled its own. Above the state was not a 
lawless space, but rather international law. However, it regulated only relations between 
states and lacked a supranational power that could hold sway irrespective of state 
power.  
Of course, a constitution could fail to fulfil its function of comprehensively juridify-
ing public power, for instance because it was porous and contradictory from the start, 
was unable to adjust to later social change, or lost acceptance. There are many examples 
of this in constitutional history. But such a failure discredits constitutionalism as little as 
the existence of numerous semi- and pseudo-constitutions that sprang up shortly after 
the founding of the constitutional state in the American and French revolutions, and 
continue to appear today. The constitution’s character as an achievement is rather dem-
onstrated by the fact that in such cases its function can only be taken over by another 
constitution, not sustained without one. No functional equivalent can stand in for a 
failed or ineffective constitution (Luhmann 1973: 168).
 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DENATIONALIZATION 
The decline of statehood places not individual constitutions but constitutionalism as 
such in question. The reason for this lies in the constitution’s reference to the state. The 
rise of the state awoke the need to tame it legally and at the same time allowed it to be 
satisfied in the form of the constitution. From a historical perspective, the constitution 
presupposes the state as a form of political community. It is distinguished from older 
forms of the political community by the bundling of the various scattered powers and 
their concentration in a uniform public power, including the authority to use physical 
force within a delimited territory. Denationalization thus means that ruling authority is 
detached from the state and transferred to non-state bearers. This transition need not 
necessarily lead to the end of the state. It is entirely possible that it will remain as a ba-
sic unit of a new political order; however, just as it had initially not yet arrogated all 
powers, in the future it will no longer possess all powers.  Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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The constitution is of course not only affected when the state disappears. Its claim to 
comprehensively regulate political rule is already impaired when the identity of state 
power and public power dissolves, so that acts of public authority can be taken on the 
territory of the state by, or with the participation of, non-state institutions. The notion of 
denationalization allows us to grasp two processes that started in the second half of the 
twentieth century, without their consequences for constitutionalism initially being no-
ticed. They concern precisely the two borders that are presupposed by and constitutive 
of the constitution: that between inside and outside, and that between private and public. 
In the domestic realm it has to do with the participation of private actors in the exercise 
of public power. Outside the state it has to do with the rise of supra-national entities or 
institutions that can make decisions that claim validity within state territory. 
Regarding the border between private and public,
7 it is striking that sovereign meas-
ures often no longer come about through one-sided state decisions in legally regulated 
procedures, but are rather the result of bilateral agreements between state bodies and 
private interests that come out of informal negotiations. We encounter such negotiations 
in the fields of administration and adjudication, but also in legislation. Either the state 
enters into negotiations over the content of a law with its private addressees or the latter 
offer talks with the prospect of avoiding or mitigating regulation. The result can be a 
negotiated bill that must then go through the constitutionally prescribed procedures in 
order to become generally binding. But the legislative power can also serve merely as a 
threat in order to reach an agreement in which a private party that creates a problem 
agrees to commit itself to “good behavior” while the state responds by forgoing regula-
tion.  
While agreements which result in a bill only reach their goal when they subsequently 
achieve legal form through the designated state procedures, in the case of agreements 
that replace law, not only the negotiation but also its result, the solution of the problem, 
remain in the informal realm. All the same, the desired effect only sets in when both 
sides feel bound by it. For this reason, such negotiations cannot be equated with the 
long-customary influence of pressure groups on legislation. The attempt to influence 
legislation is limited to a preliminary stage that is not governed by constitutional law, 
whereas the final decision is solely a matter for the state. Where informal agreements 
replace the law, however, the results of negotiations and the content of regulation are 
identical. It therefore does not do justice to the negotiations to describe them in terms of 
influence. They can only be adequately grasped in terms of participation.  
                                                 
7  On this, see the early essay by Böckenförde (1976); on the following: Grimm (1994; 2001; 2003b); Benz (1994); 
Rossen-Stadtfeld 1999); Helberg (1999), Köpp (2001), Michael (2002), Tsebelis (2002), Herdegen and Morlok 
(2003). Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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With regard to denationalization, this means, on the one hand, that there are now pri-
vate parties who are no longer restricted to their general civic status as voters, partici-
pants in public discourse, and representatives of interests; beyond this they participate in 
political decision making without being subject to the principles of legitimation and 
accountability to which the constitution submits the bearers of public power. On the 
other hand, to the extent that the state commits itself at the negotiating table, the consti-
tutionally prescribed decision-making authorities and procedures are downgraded. This 
affects the legislature in particular. The negotiations are conducted not by it, but by the 
government. If a bill emerges, it can only attain legal validity through a parliamentary 
decision. The majority parties, however, are under practically irresistable pressure to 
ratify. If there is an agreement to forego regulation, parliament remains outside the 
game altogether.  
Without parliament, the advantages of parliamentary procedures are lost. These are 
above all transparency, participation, and control. They have no place in negotiations. 
Negotiations are not public, include only those who possess veto power rather than all 
those affected, and give the opposition no chance to intervene. But the weakening of 
parliament also affects the content of the law or its informal substitute. Since the gov-
ernment only negotiates with those in a position to veto, their interests have a better 
chance of being considered. Under these circumstances the law risks falling short of 
general acceptance on which its legitimacy is based. The reason for privileging particu-
lar private parties lies not in their pre-political strength, which to a certain extent can be 
shrugged off, but in the procedures created by the state that reward precisely the posi-
tions of social power the constitution sought to neutralize.  
The losses affect not only the constitution’s democratic claim, but also the rule of 
law. The linchpin of all constitutional functions is the law (in detail Grimm 2002d). 
Without the law’s inherent formality, its effect would not obtain. The agreements, how-
ever, evade this formalization. As a rule they are set into writing, but not necessarily 
publicized. Rather, the parties to the negotiation have discretion over whether and how 
they are announced. Compliance is not institutionally guaranteed. Sometimes reporting 
duties and control mechanisms are included, sometimes not. Above all, however, af-
fected third parties have no legal protection against informal agreements. Often even the 
necessary knowledge of the agreement’s content is lacking. If one knows nothing about 
it, one can neither bring a claim against it nor have it reviewed. In the absence of a law 
there is neither a legal standard for controlling compliance nor an object for constitu-
tional review.  
Despite these losses to democracy and the rule of law, the practice cannot simply be 
eliminated because it has its own logic. This results from the fact that many state tasks 
can no longer be adequately fulfilled with the specific state tool of imperative law. Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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Sometimes the tasks are such that the use of imperative tools is in fact impossible be-
cause they elude regulation. Research results or economic upturns cannot be com-
manded. Sometimes the use of imperative tools is not legally permissible because basic 
rights ensure private actors’ freedom of choice. Ordering them to invest or obliging 
them to create jobs would be unconstitutional. Sometimes imperative tools are in fact 
possible and permissible, but ineffective or inopportune, be it because the addressees of 
regulation could evade it, because the state lacks the information for effective steering, 
or because the implementation costs are too high.  
Negotiation owes its emergence to this situation. To this extent, it has structural 
causes and is thus largely immune to constitutional prohibition. The claim of the consti-
tution can therefore only be re-established by constitutionalizing the practice of negotia-
tion. This would of course be essentially to approve it, including its basic characteristic, 
its informality. A thoroughgoing formalization would deprive it of its distinctiveness 
and therefore has little chance of success. On the other hand, if informality is retained, 
constitutional regulation cannot penetrate to the core of the phenomenon but only alter 
its parameters, for instance by requiring publicity, making it obligatory to inform par-
liament, and opening possibilities for constitutional review (Brohm 1992; Herde-
gen/Morlok 2003). That does not change the fact, however, that the constitution cannot 
cope satisfactorily with phenomena that cross the border between private and public. It 
can fulfil its claim of comprehensive regulation only to a diminished extent.  
Like the border between public and private, the border between inside and outside 
has not disappeared.
8 In relations among states it retains its traditional significance. The 
authority of the state and the applicability of domestic law ends at the border. Above the 
states, however, entities and organizations, while owing their existence to international 
treaties between states, have developed that are different from traditional international 
organizations. Their activity is not limited to the international realm but penetrates 
states. This is because they are authorized to take acts of public authority that claim do-
mestic validity without being transformed by the state into national law. On the other 
hand, the pooling of sovereignty has not gone so far that various states have been fused 
into a new superstate that would displace rather than relativize the borders between in-
side and outside.  
This development is not expressly directed against the constitution. More recent con-
stitutions often open themselves to international law by stipulating that it be applied 
domestically or allowing sovereign rights to be transferred (cf. die Fabio 1998; Hobe 
1998; Wahl 2001; 2002b; Hecker 2002). All the same, the constitution does not remain 
untouched. It determines the conditions under which states may transfer sovereign 
                                                 
8   On the significance of the state’s borders, see di Fabio (2001: 51ff.). Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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rights to supranational entities. Once transferred, however, their use by these entities is 
no longer subject to the rules of the national constitution.
9 It then regulates domestic 
laws and their application only partially – namely, to the extent that they stem from a 
national source of law. These are, however, confronted with a growing number of legal 
measures that make the same validity claim as national law, but without having to sat-
isfy the same constitutional requirements. The most advanced example of this is the EU, 
with its numerous sovereign rights replacing the regulative power of the nation-state.  
So far there has been no supranational arrangement of the same density either outside 
Europe or on a global scale. But other international organizations also contribute to the 
relativization of borders. The most prominent of these is the WTO (v. Bogdandy 2001; 
Krajewsky 2001). To be sure, it does not itself make law, but rather provides a forum 
for the treaty agreements of its member-states. But since 1995 its dispute-settlement 
mechanism has made the treaty-based law independent of the contracting parties and 
submitted them to the decisions of the WTO authority. The World Bank and the IMF 
lack such powers (Kranz 1994; Shihata 1995). They may not interfere in the politics of 
states. However, law and justice are not considered politics in this sense. As a result, 
they often make their financial assistance conditional on domestic legal changes the 
affected countries usually cannot avoid. To this extent, the requirements of their own 
constitutions concerning political decisions are supplanted.  
Alongside these institutions created by states, meanwhile, are global actors like mul-
tinational firms and non-government organizations, which, by virtue of the range of 
their activities, can largely follow their own systemic logic without having to respect the 
standards and obligations that prevail within states. All the same, they too cannot live 
without legal regulation. The globalized sector of the economy depends on a transna-
tional law no national legislator can provide. But even the international organizations 
developed by states can only satisfy this need in part. Global actors therefore take up 
law-making themselves. Beyond nation-states and the international organizations they 
have established forms of law-making that are no longer under the control of politics, be 
it domestic or international, but are driven mainly by large global law firms and interna-
tional arbitration panels (Teubner 1997; Santos 1995; Günther 2001).  
In addition, international courts relativize the constitution to the extent that they do 
not stay within the traditional framework of international law and may only administer 
justice if parties submit themselves to judgment in a concrete case in advance. The 
European Court of Human Rights is an early example of this. In the meantime, how-
                                                 
9  This is recognized in principle, although the particulars are still contested. See the ruling of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht on the review of European legislation, BVerfGE 37, 271; 73, 339; 89, 155. See Grimm (1997); 
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ever, international criminal courts have emerged to try war crimes and crimes against 
humanity even when it concerns members of states that have not submitted themselves 
to their jurisdiction or have refused to hand over the accused (Cassese 1998: 2; Meron 
1998; Symposion 1999). Here again, the jurisdiction of the EU has an exceptional posi-
tion. It was the European Court that secured the immediate validity of Community law 
and its precedence over national law, including national constitutions. In this way, it 
considerably narrowed the latter’s field of application, and for its part took up functions 
that constitutional courts possess on the national level (Weiler 1999; Iglesisas 1992: 
225; Mayer 2003: 229).  
This development is nevertheless still far from the end of stateness. States are ceding 
functions to supranational units and organizations. But they are doing so in the interest 
of increasing problem-solving capacity without thereby making themselves superfluous. 
Rather, in the end supranational organizations and even global economic actors depend 
on states. The reason is that as yet no supranational political unit or international or-
ganization possesses the means of physical coercion, which belongs specifically to 
states. As soon as the coercive enforcement or implementation of international law is 
required, national authorities must step in. This is true even of the EU. The norms 
whose implementation is in question may be made externally; their implementation is a 
national matter and falls under national law. But this does not change the fact that the 
scope of validity of the national constitution constricts as that of law made externally 
expands.  
The question this raises is whether and how the achievement of constitutionalism can 
be preserved in view of this development. Here we must distinguish between the na-
tional and the international level. On the national level the possibilities appear limited. 
National constitutions can provide for the state’s opening to supranational arrangements 
and establish the conditions for the transfer of sovereign rights. Beyond this, they can 
safeguard constitutional requirements in the determination of national negotiating posi-
tions for supranational decision-making processes, such as parliamentary participation. 
This is not unimportant, since supranational legislation is consistently executive legisla-
tion, following a model of bargaining rather than deliberation (v. Bogdandy 2000). This 
does not, however, guarantee that these positions will prevail. Other possibilities on the 
national level are not visible. The national constitution has neither formal nor material 
influence on laws that penetrate the state from the outside.  
The more important question is thus whether the constitution can be transferred to 
the international level. There has lately been much discussion of this of. Scholars see 
constitutionalization at work everywhere. A constitutionalization of the EU was ascer-
tained very early on. But in the meantime a constitutionalization of international organi-
zations like the WTO and the UN has been perceived as well. Even international law as Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
- 14 - 
a whole is supposed to be on the way to a constitution.
10 This observation is correct in-
sofar as a strong push toward juridification has been occurring at the international level. 
But not all juridification merits the name of constitutionalization.
11 Rather, constitution-
alization has shown itself to be a special form of the juridification of rule that presup-
poses the concentration of all ruling authority within a territory, and is distinguished by 
a certain standard of juridification. This standard includes a democratic origin, suprem-
acy, and comprehensiveness (detail Grimm 2003: 58ff.). 
The need for juridification develops where political rule is exercised. Whether it can 
be satisfied in the form of a constitution depends on certain preconditions and standards 
being met. More strongly put, the question is whether the constitution, as a form of ju-
ridification that originally referred to the state, can be detached from it and transferred 
to non-state political entities that exercise public power. If not, it will remain a matter of 
mere juridification, which is by no means worthless, but should not be passed off as 
equivalent to a constitution. Of course, the question cannot be answered in the same 
way for all political entities that are ascertained to exercise sovereign powers or make 
decisions whose effect is tantamount to such powers. There are important differences 
between them in the degree of consolidation and plenitude of powers that are relevant to 
the possibility of constitutionalization.  
If we ask this question first of all concerning the EU, we find a structure that has 
grown far beyond traditional international organizations but has still not become a state. 
It unites a considerable number of sovereign rights in different political fields that can 
be exercised with immediate validity in the member states. Even without a monopoly on 
the use of force, which its members so far retain, it is closely interwoven with the mem-
ber states and their legal orders in a way similar to the national and the member states in 
a federal state. The resulting need for a juridification of the public power has surely long 
since been satisfied. Primary Community law, which spread step by step, has overlain 
the EU with a tightly-woven net of provisions that have pre-eminence over the Secon-
dary Community law produced by the EU and fulfils most of the functions of constitu-
tions in the member states.  
                                                 
10  On the EU, see Weiler (1999), Pernice (1999: 427)); Möller (2003: 1), Badura (1999: 695), Oeter (1999: 901), and 
Peters (2001); on the EMRK, see Walter (1999: 961), on the WTO Petersmann (1991), Langer (1995), v. Bog-
dandy (2001), Krajweski (2001), Stoll (1997: 83), and Nettesheim (2001: 381); on the UN Faßbender (1998: 529), 
and on international law Frowein (2000). 
11  On constitutionalization and “international” constitutional law, see Biaggini (2000: 445), Uerpmann (2001: 565), 
Walter (2000: 1), Pernice, Huber, Lübbe-Wolff, and Grabenwarter (2001: 148–349, esp. 155ff., 199ff.), Wahl 
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Measured by the demanding concept of the constitution that has become the standard 
since the American and French Revolutions, they lack only one element – which, how-
ever, is surely essential. They are, not only in their development but also according to 
their legal nature, international treaties that have been contracted by the member states. 
So, they can only be altered by them in the intergovernmental Conference, which is not 
an EU organ, with subsequent ratification within each member state. The public power 
the EU exercises accordingly emanates not from the people, but from the member-
states. Responsibility for the basic order that sets its goals, establishes its organs, and 
regulates its authorities and procedures, cannot be ascribed to the constituent power of 
the people. Nor is any EU organ that represents the people responsible for it. As distinct 
from the constitution as the basic legal order of states, it is heteronomously, not 
autonomously, determined (see Grimm 1995a). Not being attributed to the people, it 
lacks democratic origin, which is an element of a somewhat meaningful notion of con-
stitution.  
Admittedly, there can be no doubt that the EU, by virtue of its consolidation and vol-
ume of powers, is capable of being constitutionalized. Nothing prevents the member 
states from giving up their control over the basic legal order of the EU in a final interna-
tional treaty, placing the Union on a democratic basis, and thereby bestowing upon it 
self-determination over the form and content of its political community. They could 
then still reserve the right to participate in amendments of the constitution – not, how-
ever, as the bearers of federal power, but rather as parts of its organs. With this, the trea-
ties, without requiring any other substantive change, would carry over into a constitu-
tion in the full sense of the word. Yet, by such an act, the EU would quietly transform 
itself from a federation of states into a federal state. For the line separating the two is 
heteronomy or self determination of its basic order.  
A constitutionalized EU would nevertheless be no more immune to a relativization of 
its borders than the nation-states are (Walter 2000). Its constitution could not, any more 
than the national constitutions, fulfil the claim to comprehensively regulate all acts of 
rule on its territory. The constitutional question is therefore posed again at the global 
level. Here too the process of juridification is proceeding apace. Its main fields of appli-
cation are, although unconnected, economic relations and human rights. The share of 
compulsory international law that therefore takes primacy over the treaty-making power 
of the states is increasing. It is also increasingly judicially enforceable. That the internal 
constitutionalization (of states) is now being followed by external constitutionalization 
(of the community of states), as is asserted (di Fabio 2001: 68), however, does not prove 
true upon closer examination. If we maintain the distinction between juridification and 
constitutionalization, it emerges that already the basic precondition for the latter is lack-
ing: an object that could be constitutionalized.  Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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Just as public power at the international level breaks down into numerous uncon-
nected institutions with sharply limited jurisdictions, so its legal regulation breaks down 
into numerous unconnected partial orders. A bundling that could make them appear as 
the expression of unified intention and would also allow a unified interpretation of them 
is not to be expected even in the long-term. Even more, democratic legitimation and 
responsibility is far off. The aspiration contained in the concept of constitutionalism can 
therefore not even be approximately realized on the global level. This is no reason to 
attach little value to the progress connected to the increasing juridification of the world 
order. To equate it with the constitution, however, is to paper over the fundamental dif-
ference and create the impression that the declining significance of national constitu-
tions can be made good at the international level. There is no prospect of that for the 
time being. Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 2) 
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